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1. Introduction 
Since 1991 with the approval of the Water Act, Mozambican water sector has experienced 
great transformations. New forms of water governance were introduced in the Southern 
region, formalized with the Water Act in 1991 and later on confirmed by the National Water 
Policies of 1995 and 2007 (Bolding and Alba 2013). River basin became the unit for water 
resource management substituting existing administrative divisions, followed by the 
decentralization of decision-making to river basin authorities and creation of new arenas for 
stakeholder participation, the river basin committees (Inguane et al. 2013). From public 
management structures, private forms of management and market-based policies have been 
initiated. Since the middle 1990s, thirteen river basins have been defined following the 
watershed features and five Regional Water Administrations (ARAs, Administrações 
Regional de Agua) established (Fig. 1). River basin committees have been introduced in most 
of the basins. Mozambican water reforms followed and partly anticipated Integrated Water 
Resource Management (IWRM), a dominant paradigm in water resource management that 
since the 1990s has influenced the governance of water sectors all around the world and in 
particular of several Southern African countries (Metha et al.2014; Bolding and Alba 2013).1  
 
Among other elements, the Water Act established a formal framework for allocation of water 
rights (direito de uso e aproveitamento de agua, in English the right to use and exploit water) 
based on licenses and payments for use of bulk water. The Law differentiates between usos 
comuns and privativos. The former refers to small subsistence water uses for primary needs 
such as domestic use, watering livestock and irrigation for plots up to 1 ha without the use of 
siphoning or mechanical instruments (Van der Zaag, P. 2010). The latter concern bulk water 
use for industry, agriculture and energy production. While common uses are free of charge 
and do not involve a licence, private ones require a licence (or concession, here also referred 
as permit) and are subjected to the payment of a taxa de agua, in English water tax (GoM, 
1991). Regional Water Administrations are responsible both for registering users, issuing 
water licences and collection fees.  
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"!For a discussion about the history and criticisms related with Integrated Water Resource Management 
see Merrey (2008), Van der Zaag (2005) and Molle (2008). For insights about the introduction of 
IWRM policies in Mozambique see Gallego-Ayala and Juizo (2011, 2012) and Inguane et al. (2013).  
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Fig. 1- Regional Water Administrations and Limpopo River Basin 
(source: www.limpopopark.org, last visited 25.07.2014)  
 
 
In Mozambique as in many other countries, water plays a key role for economic growth, 
poverty alleviation and capital accumulation. Water represents a key input for agricultural 
production (including smallholder farming, large-scale irrigation schemes, agro-industrial 
companies, etc.), industry (e.g. mining companies) and potable use. As a World Bank study 
notices ‘Mozambique’s poverty is closely linked to its dependence on rain-fed subsistence 
farming in the context of highly variable rainfall and frequent droughts’ (WB, 2005:5). In 
light of increasing foreign investments in mining, together with ‘the adoption by the 
Mozambican government of an agricultural policy that favours agricultural development 
through foreign corporate investments’ (Veldwisch et al. 2013:129) who gets access to water 
and how represents a fundamental question in relation to equal distribution of water 
resources. Water allocation within Mozambique becomes even more relevant given the 
downstream position of the country that shares with neighbouring countries nine river basins 
covering most of the Mozambican territory. In this concern, legal water right frameworks 
play a key role as they involve decisions concerning access and allocation of water resources 
among different uses and users at river basin level. In other words, they define who has the 
right to abstract water from a river and use it and ‘provide opportunities and/or barriers to 
sustain one’s claim and mobilize resources and people’ (Veldwisch et al. 2013:125).  
 
Permits refer to legal entitlements or formal authorization, in the form of licence or 
concession, to abstract a certain amount of water from a source issued by a stage agency to a 
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user.2  Permits contribute to ‘reserve’ water for certain uses and make users’ administratively 
visible as a licence formally recognize not only the existence of a user but also her or his 
water requirements. They offer the opportunity to account for committed water use and water 
available for future development within a river basin becoming a way to secure water. In 
neoliberal thinking, water permits represents a mean for ensuring rational water use and 
address water scarcity (Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005). However, a number of ‘side effects’ 
play a role in this context. First, power relations and availability of economic resources 
influence users´ ability to obtain a permit. Large scale and better-off users can make use of 
their resources to secure access of water at the expense of other, less powerful, users (Metha 
et al. 2012). Third, in Southern Africa the institution of legal frameworks for water rights 
allocation has often been tied together with the introduction of forms of water payments such 
as (volumetric) water pricing (Van Koppen 2003). Registration comes with taxation, 
discouraging smallholder registration and keeping them ´invisible´ and their uses not 
accounted for (Veldwisch et al., 2013).   
 
Drawing from the experience of Limpopo River Basin, this paper describes and analyse the 
articulation of the framework for water right definition introduced by the Water Act and its 
(side) effects on water resources allocation. It sheds a light on the functioning of licences and 
payments for private water uses and their implications for the control over water resources. 
The paper does not aim at providing a complete discussion about water rights as it mostly 
focuses on the legal aspects. Yet, holding a licence (or not) and pay for water (or not) does 
not guarantee the physical/effective access to water (Ribot and Peluso 2003).  
 
The paper is based on literature review, interviews and document analysis carried out in the 
Netherlands and Southern Mozambique between March and June 2013 (Alba, 2013). The 
research combined fieldwork research and ‘studying up’ (Nader 1972). The former includes 
interviews and focus group discussion with representatives of large-scale users and 
smallholder ones abstracting water for agricultural use along Limpopo riverbanks. The latter 
focuses on the perspectives of the people that have influenced the policy process (i.e. the 
introduction of a legal framework for water permits and payments) by setting the terms of 
reference and taking part to key events such as the drafting the Water Act or the National 
Water Policies. Interviewees included senior and young engineers, consultants, lawyers, 
academics, staff of the National Water Directorate (DNA, Direção Nacional das Aguas) and 
employees of the regional water administrations. The combination between field research and 
‘studying up’ provided new insights on the role of international, national and local actors in 
shaping policy articulation and everyday water management practices. The extended periods 
of fieldwork in the Limpopo River Basin and in other regions of Mozambique by two of the 
authors of the paper provided background information and useful insights (Ducrot 2011).   
 
The paper is organized as follow. The first section re-constructs the articulation of water 
rights framework in Mozambican water policies. The second part focuses on the practices 
related with water permits and payments for water in Limpopo River Basin. Eventually, some 
conclusions and recommendations are presented.  
 
2. The articulation of water rights in Mozambique: where do permits 
and payment come from? 
Before illustrating the current practices related with water allocation, we delve into the history 
of water permits and payments. Through three policy episodes (cf. Wester 2008) we re-
construct the evolution of the water sector and the main events occurred at national level and 
within Limpopo Basin. Each period corresponds with the formulation and endorsement of key 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
#!In the case of Mozambique, two types of water permits exist: licence or concession. They main 
difference resides in the validity of the permit as the licence last 5 years and then has to be renovated, 
while the concession last 50 years (GoM, 1991).!
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national policy documents: the 1991 Water Law, the 1995 National Water Policy and the 
2007 new National Water Policy). The first episode traces the emergence of the water permits 
during the Portuguese time and its formalization in the Water Law and the second focuses on 
the neoliberal transformations occurred in the 1990s. The third describes the promotion and 
acceleration of the operationalization of the water permits and payments from the early 2000s 
onwards.  
 
Users’ registration and fees collection introduced in the 1990s, remained latent for more than 
ten years and subsequently experienced a rapid acceleration after 2007. The policies 
regarding water permits have preserved the wide definition of primary water uses and 
licenses/payments for private water uses.  Meanwhile, water fees have received increasing 
attention influenced by neoliberal transformations, the limited state funds and the increased 
attention towards achieving cost recovery. Indeed, the history of permit and payments went 
hand in hand with the establishment of the decentralized Regional Water Authorities and their 
effort to reach financial sustainability and decision-making autonomy from the central 
government. 
 
1. Episode one: emergence of water permits 
The reform of the water sector started around the 1970s and culminated with the approval of 
the Water Act in 1991, the only water legislation ever approved by the Parliament in 
Mozambique. The Act is the result of the commitment of a small group of Mozambican 
engineers and the influence of Dutch and international experts supported by FAO and 
UNESCO (DNA 1984; Mifsud 1986). Several issues steered the formulation of the Act: the 
need to manage water infrastructures inherited from the Colonial time, the lack of a legal 
provision for water allocation (Caponera 1983), the national and international impulse for 
decentralization of water resource management (Inguane et al., 2013) and the consequent 
need to finance new institutions steered the formulation of the Law. Licences and concession 
for private uses were introduced. Water charges were intended as a mean to promote “pratica 
adequadas à correcta utilizaçao e consevaçao da agua e à prevençao dacontaminaçao ou 
reduçao do seu nivel”3 and as a cost recovery mechanism (Art. 42 and 44 Water Act, GoM 
1991). The Law established that the taxa de agua (should) represent the main revenue of the 
ARAs (art. 42), linking revenue collection to the financial and managerial autonomy of the 
Regional Water Authorities. 
 
Both colonial and early post-colonial government promoted the development of hydraulic 
infrastructure (Carmo Vaz, 2003). Dams and irrigation schemes were developed for 
electricity and agricultural production and flood control (Newitt 1995). For boosting the 
Portuguese presence in Limpopo Valley, the Colonado do Limpopo was created following the 
construction of Chokwe irrigation scheme and Macarretane weir. The post-colonial state 
further invested in water infrastructures development with the aim of improving the potential 
production in the agricultural and energy sectors. Limpopo Valley received great attention 
also after Independence by newly established FRELIMO government. Chokwe irrigation 
scheme was defined as the ‘breadbasket of the nation’ (Pellizzoli 2010). In the Limpopo river 
basin, Massingir dam was built between 1972 and 1977 following a Portuguese project. The 
first water bureaucracies were established to manage newly constructed infrastructure; the 
first water fees were introduced to cover maintenance costs of the dams (WaterGroup 1988; 
Manjate 2010). Among others, the Unidade de Direcçao de Aprovietamento Hidraulicos 
(UDAH) in charge of coordinating the construction works of two main dams Corumana and 
Pequenos Limbos inspired the creation of the ARAs and their operational river basin units. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
$!“Appropriate practices for the proper use and conservation of water and the prevention of the 
contamination or reduction of its level” [our translation].!
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2. Episode two: the neoliberal turn 
The first National Water Policy was approved in 1995, followed by the Water Tariff Policy in 
1998 (GoM, 1995). Mozambique was worn out by several years of conflict, a sever famine 
(1991-92) and natural disasters (e.g. floods). The government signed a structural adjustment 
programme with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and received aid from the World 
Bank (WB) and several international donors. After the peace agreement in 1994 and the first 
multi-party election, the domestic agenda focused on reconstruction and provision of basic 
service including water supply and sanitation. Following a combination of neo-liberal, market 
inspired IMF/WB concerns and domestic concerns, the National Water Policy put its 
emphasis on Water Supply and Sanitation, public-private partnerships in water provision and 
stakeholder participation (Alba, 2013). Water was defined as an economic and social good. 
Cost recovery and financial aspects gained much attention, increasing the concerns for water 
pricing mechanism. Meanwhile, the decentralization proceeded with the formal establishment 
of the first Regional Water Authority, ARA-Sul in 1993, and the River Basin Committees 
(Limpopo River Basin committee met for the first time in 1998).  
 
The policy was influenced also by emerging IWRM ideas and demand driven approaches, 
water pricing and increased private role in the water sector (Savenije and Van der Zaag 2002; 
Molle and Berkoff 2007; WB 1993).  
 
3. Episode three: promotion and acceleration 
In 2007 another key moment occurs when the Council of Ministers approved the new 
National Water Policy and the National Water Resources Management Strategy (GoM 2007). 
Both documents represent the result of a long consultation process that involved the creation 
of a national stakeholder forum, the work of several consultancies directed by the National 
Water Directorate sponsored by the World Bank. In the same year, the Regulamento de 
Licenças e Concesões, in English Regulation on Water Licenses and Concessions (GoM 2007) 
was approved. It includes the guidelines for granting water permits, in the form of license or 
concession, and the collection of water taxes. Together with the 1991 Law, it sets the 
framework for water rights in Mozambique. The Regulamento is the result of more than ten 
years of discussions started in 1991 with the endorsement of the Water Law and hold back by 
disagreements regarding the allocation of responsibilities among different state institutions in 
relation to issuing permits (see also Inguane 2010). 
 
During the 2000s, the last regional water authority was formally created (2006), while several 
river basin committees were set up. Once that the institutional framework was in place and all 
ARAs were formally established, the focus shifted towards improving their financial 
autonomy both from the central state and from the donors by improving their ability to collect 
fees from water users (Alba, 2013).  
 
3. Water permits in practice: three examples from Limpopo River 
As mentioned above, once the Regulamento de Licenças e Concesões was approved the 
attention shifted to its implementation. Yet, the Regional Water Authorities had to deal with 
limited financial and human resources, geographical constraints and political difficulties. In 
this section, first the main characteristics of the Mozambican part of the Limpopo Basin and 
the water governance framework are presented. Then, the process of obtaining a licence is 
described followed by three examples that offer some insights on the everyday water 
management practices in the basin.  
 
Limpopo River flows through Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe before reaching 
Mozambique. Here it covers a length of 450 km over the 1460 km full length of the river 
(Ducrot 2011). The river represents a key source of livelihood for the communities scattered 
along the riverbanks, as it is the major source of water for irrigation and also for domestic 
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uses (e.g. livestock watering). Indeed, within the Mozambican part of the basin, most of the 
users use water for agricultural purposes, most of them cultivating an area between 4 and 30 
ha. The river is a source of water for two main irrigation schemes one located in Chokwe and 
the second in Xai Xai. The river also contributes to cover drinking water needs for the two 
main cities, Chokwe and Xai Xai.  
 
The Southern Regional Water Administration (ARA-Sul, Administracaõ Regional de Agua) 
through its management unit (UGBL, Unidade de Gestao de Bacia Do Limpopo) manages 
water resources. UGBL is in charge the management of the main infrastructures (dams, 
hydrometric and pluviometric stations), the registration of water users, organization of the 
cadaster and the collection of water fees. By managing Massingir dam and Macarretane weir, 
UGBL influence the quantity of water present in the river in relation to the water demand by 
the users. The Limpopo River Basin Committee (Comité da bacía do Limpopo, CBL) serves 
as a consultative body for coordination between different users and institution involved in 
land and water management in the river basin. However, even thought the Committee has 
been set-up in name of stakeholder participation, these have little say concerning decision-
making at basin level and the Committee rather works as an advisory body (Praagman 2013).  
 
As Van der Zaag et al. (2010) highlight, great uncertainties surround the availably and use of 
water within the river basin. This is due to uncertainties surrounding future water 
development in upstream countries, incomplete discharge measurements and limited 
information on the water that is currently consumed particularly for agricultural production 
and domestic uses. The available information about water uses and users is the cadastre of 
ARA-Sul. In 2012 within Limpopo Basin 280 private users were acknowledged together with 
an indefinite number of so-called ‘common users’. Private water users are listed according to 
three categories: known but not registered, registered on the process of obtaining a licence 
and licenced. In 2012, 92 users were known but not registered, 120 were registered but not 
licenced and 68 had a formal licence. Registration and licensing of water users concentrated 
on the areas where water flow is regulated by Massing dam, that correspond to the Olifant 
river downstream the dam and along Limpopo river downstream the confluence (Fig. 2). 
These are the only permanent branches of the basin, all other branches including the main 
riverbed flowing from Zimbabwe dries up at least 3 months a year. This partly explains why 
in in April 2013, all the users upstream the confluence in the main riverbed flowing from 
Zimbabwe were (still) exempted from registration and payment. The table below show the 
number of registered users per use (Tab. 2). 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 – Geographical distribution of the registered and licenced water users  
(source: presentation to Limpopo River Basin Committee 2009) 
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Tab. 2 – Distribution of users per water use (source: cadastre ARA-Sul 2012) 
Type of use and cultivated 
area 
Number of 
registered 
users* 
Agriculture  
  < 1 ha 8 
  Between 1 and 3 ha 51 
  Between 4 and 30 ha 207 
  Between 50 and 1000 ha 8 
  > 1000 ha 2 
Livestock  1 
Water supply 2 
Industry 1 
Total  280 
*Registered users are not necessarily licence or concession holders. 
 
 
According to the Regulamento de Licenças e Concesões, in order to obtain a licence, the user 
should present a series of documents to the ARA including proof of identification, details 
about the source, place, objectives, period and duration of water abstraction, the purpose and, 
in case of agricultural use, the area cultivated and the crop produced have to be indicated. The 
obtainment of a water licence is subjected to the possession of a land right (in Portuguese 
Direito de Uso e Aproveitamento da Terra, DUAT). The ARA´s technical department is in 
charge of verifying the availability of water resources and together with the legal department, 
the validity of the documents presented. A field visit is carried out by local staff to check the 
correctness of the information provided by the users. In case water is available and documents 
are correct, the user obtains the license. The administrative process is rather bureaucratic and 
could last even on year. The administrative process is thus rather bureaucratic and could last 
even one year. Interviews with users and water authorities revealed several reasons that partly 
explain the length of the process. Water administrations lack human and financial resources. 
Users do not always have all the documents requested, among others they do not have a 
DUAT or they are in process of obtaining one (Alba, 2013). According to some interviewees, 
the users unwilling to pay water charges purposely further slowdown the process by refusing 
to show the documents listed above.  
 
Once a user holds a licence, he or she is required to pay for the water abstracted based on 
calculation and invoice issued by the Regional Water Authority. Water tariffs differ per ARA 
and, within a region, they vary according to the river basin depending on the Organization 
and Management costs of the hydraulic infrastructure (if present) and the water 
administration. In the case of Limpopo River Basin the tariffs are provided below (Tab. 3). 
The tariffs are approved by the Ministry of Public Works and Housing based on a proposal 
made by the ARAs. In this way, the central government maintained the control over the 
setting of the water fees, limiting the decision-making power of the ARAs.  
 
Tab. 3 – Tariffs ARA-Sul (source: Ducrot 2011) 
User Type MT/m3 (1MT = 0.0312 USD) 
Agriculture  
Household < 1 ha Free 
Commercial sector < 50 ha 0.048 
Commercial sector 50-1000 ha 0.08 
Commercial sector > 1000 ha 0.096 
Industry 0.159 
Water Supply   
Big system 0.159 
Small system 0.08 
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Three examples below show how the size (in hectares), political history and relationship with 
the water authority shape the process of obtaining a formal licence. The first example 
concerns the allocation of water to state’s agricultural enterprises present in the basin, namely 
HICEP (Hidraulica de Chokwe –Empresa Publica) and RBL-EP (Regadio do Baixo 
Limpopo-Empresa Publica). The second focuses on Massingir Agro-Industrial (MAI), a 
large-scale agro-industrial investment for sugar cane production that should start in 2017 
(Hall and Paradza 2012). The last example focuses on the smallholder users scattered along 
the riverbanks. The objective is to show three ways in which the policy, as encoded in the 
Water Law and the Regulation for Licence and Concession, is translated in contingent 
practices Three main features are considered in the description of the cases: a) how do the 
users physically get their water (e.g. one intake, individual pumps); b) presence of a formal 
licence; c) payment mechanisms. These are briefly summarized in the table below (Tab. 4). 
!
1. State versus State 
In Limpopo River Basin there are a few big water users, two of them are state enterprises 
under the Ministry of Agriculture: HICEP and RBL-EP. Due to their political importance and 
their linkages with the central government, these enterprises enjoy a special regime in relation 
to water licensing and tax collection. Both of the enterprises are represented in the River basin 
Committee.  
 
The first, HICEP was created in 1997 to manage Chokwe irrigation scheme. The scheme, 
with its 22,000 ha command area is the largest and oldest irrigated perimeter in Mozambique 
with commercial farming, smallholder and medium farmers (Pellizzoli 2010). In 2012, nearly 
12,000 farmers were occupying the scheme (Chilundo et al. 2012). However, in 2010 only 
9,400 ha were actually irrigated (Van der Zaag et al. 2010) and during the hot season 
2011/2012 the area cultivated amounted to 5781 ha (Chilundo et al. 2012). Since 
Independence, agricultural production in Chokwe scheme has been decreasing together with 
the actual irrigated area. The poor status of the infrastructure, salinization, limited access to 
inputs (e.g. seeds and fertilizer), unreliable market access (few buyers, long distance) and lack 
of processing facilities represent some factors underling the poor performance of the scheme 
(Veldwisch et al., 2013). 
 
From the perspective of UGBL, the scheme represents only one large-scale user that abstract 
water from one single intake. From the intake, the water flows for gravity to the whole 
irrigation scheme and part of it returns to the river through the drainage system (Alba, 2013). 
Once a month, UGBL and HICEP staff meet at the intake and measure the water flow. Every 
three months an invoice is issued to HICEP based on the average between the measured water 
flow in the three previous months discounted by 40% (ibid.). This arrangement has been 
introduced in order to facilitate the payment of the water charges by HICEP. Water 
requirements for the irrigation scheme for the whole year and the payment terms for the water 
charges are defined by HICEP and ARA-Sul/UGBL in a yearly agreement, or memorandum.  
 
It is not clear if HICEP have ever paid for water. During interviews, several explanations for 
the inability of HICEP to pay were discussed (Alba, 2013). The most common sustains that 
the irrigation scheme does not ‘use’ the whole amount of water it requires. Due to the design 
of the infrastructure gravity led a rather large amount of water is required to reach the last 
sector of the scheme (80 km far away from the intake). However, not all that water is used for 
productive use, as the actually irrigated are cover less than 5,000 ha. HICEP collects water 
fees only for the cultivated area, but it is charged by ARA-Sul for the total volume flowing 
from the main intake. Thus, HICEP is not able to pay ARA-Sul. Other interviewees referred 
to the unlikelihood that the state pays back the state.  Indeed, HICEP is a state enterprise and 
UGBL/ARA-Sul is a state administration. However, HICEP budget depend on the Ministry of 
Agriculture, while UGBL/ARA-Sul is under the authority of the Ministry of Construction and 
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Housing. Given the huge debt of HICEP towards ARA-Sul, since 2002 negotiations are 
taking place at ministerial level to settle the debt (GoM 2004).  
 
The second state enterprise, RBL-EP, administers 70 000 ha in the lower Limpopo including 
Xai-Xai irrigation scheme. The scheme originally covered an area of 12,000 hectares. The 
area managed by RBL has been recently upgraded from 12,000 ha to 70,000 ha. However, 
only part of this area is equipped with irrigation infrastructure (Ganho 2013). Since 2005 a 
Chinese investor is present in the perimeter (Chichava et al. 2013).  As in the case of Chokwe, 
RBL-EP represents one user for UGBL. As June 2013, RBL-EP did not have a licence. A 
memorandum concerning the volume of water abstracted and water charges, was under 
discussion between RBL-EP and UGBL/ARA-Sul.  
 
2. Private sector versus state: Massingir Agro-Industrial 
Since 2011, MAI (Massingir Agro-Industrial) has launched a project for the production of 
sugar cane in Massingir district. MAI is a consortium between Transvaal Suiker Beperk 
(TSB) a South African company (51%) and Limpopo Agro-Industrial Investment Company 
(SIAL), a Mozambican company whose chairperson is the former Minister of Industry 
(49%).4  MAI plans to cultivate sugar cane for a total of 37 500 ha and reserve 1000 ha for 
food security of the population living nearby the project area (Borras et al. 2011).5 Production 
should start in 2016. MAI (partly) resume a project firstly proposed by ProCana halted in 
2009 (Praagman 2013).  
 
In May 2013, MAI was in the process of obtaining land right for 38 500 ha and water licence. 
Negotiations with ARA-Sul around a memorandum were taking place in Maputo. According 
to several interviewees, the draft memorandum allowed MAI to abstract half of the water 
from Massingir Lake and half from a pumping station downstream the dam. Meters for 
calculation of the volume of water abstracted were foreseen at each intake, thus MAI 
predicted payment according to the volume abstracted.  
  
3. Small holders versus state: Focal points 
Besides the few large scale users described above, Limpopo and Olifant Rivers supply water 
to hundreds of small and medium holders who lives along the riverbanks and directly abstract 
water from the rivers using private or community owned pumps. Here we refer to smallholder 
as users (individual or collective) that cultivated less than 30ha.  
 
According to the staff working for UGBL, registration and fees collection is quite challenging 
in remote areas physically difficult to reach due to distance and bad conditions of the roads 
(Inguane 2010) leading to increased transaction costs for both UGBL staff and users (e.g. 
transport costs and time required). According to several interviewees, the lack of a culture of 
payment for water within the river basin further complicates the process.  In order to deal with 
these difficulties, between 2008 and 2009 informal groups of water users led by one Focal 
Point (FP, in Portuguese ponto focal) have been created with the support of UGBL. Often the 
Focal Point is the leader of the village or a well-known and respected man (e.g. a farmer) 
appointed by the water users. Since 2009, 13 groups have been established in the area 
downstream Massingir dam. The groups’ size is variable as the number of users as illustrated 
in Table 5. Due to the difficulties in calculating the volume abstracted, the water charges are 
calculated according to the area each user cultivates based on a study carried out by ARA-Sul 
between 2004-2005.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 http://allafrica.com/stories/201211120298.html [last visited 10/08/13] 
5 According to the project 23 000 ha will be cultivated directly by MAI, 12 000 ha will be developed by SIAL and 
2 500 ha will be cultivated by local communities under an outgrowing model.!
! "+!
Tab. 5 - Water users group Limpopo River Basin (source: our elaboration based on cadastre 2012 of 
ARA-Sul 
Users 
group  
District 
Number 
of users 
Area 
cultivated 
(ha)* 
 
Users 
group  
District 
Number 
of users 
Area 
cultivated 
(ha)* 
II Massingir 2 6  VIII Chokwe 2 2 
III Massingir 14 37  IX Chokwe 2 3 
IV Massingir 2 4  X Chokwe 18 35.5 
V Massingir 2 1.5  XI Guija 36 117 
VI Chokwe 15 26  XII Chibuto 3 0 
VII Chokwe 6 6      
VIII Chokwe 2 2      
 
 
 
The FPs facilitate the registration of users and the collection of water fees and improve 
communication and information exchange. Indeed, the FP represents a connection link 
between UGBL and the users (see Fig. 4). The Focal Point is in charge of carrying out an 
inventory of the amount of land that each user has planted and/or effectively cultivated in a 
specific area and communicates it to UGBL. On the basis of the data collected by the focal 
point, the Basin Authority calculates the water charges and issue and invoice. Then, the focal 
point is in charge to collect the money from the users and hand it in to the Basin Authority 
(Alba, 2013). FPs represents a network of water users that reach the community level and 
(should) facilitate information exchange with the river basin authority (Pragmaan, 2013). Yet, 
at the time of the research they seem to serve more as a means to collect water fees, that 
information. Focal Points and more in general smallholder farmers are little represented in the 
River Basin Committee and have a limited role in decision-making.  
 
 
Fig. 4 The focal point system (source: our elaboration) 
 
 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Water policies and practices in Mozambique are closely related to the troubled history of the 
country, the evolution of its economy and the presence of international donors. The 
Portuguese colonial period, the war for independence, the conflict between FRELIMO and 
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RENAMO, the difficult economic situation and the intervention of IMF shaped the ways the 
water sector has been organized. The ‘hydraulic mission’ (Molle et al. 2009) initiated by the 
Portuguese government with the construction of major dams and irrigation schemes, has been 
carried out by the post-colonial state (Bolding and Alba 2013). The current institutional set up 
partly originates from the Portuguese way of organizing the water sector with decentralized 
operational river basin units created for the management of water infrastructure and a central 
water bureaucracy. The reform of the water sector has been dominated by State institutions 
(e.g. DNA, ARAs) and little space has so far been reserved for the democratic participation of 
water users. River Basin Committees represents the only arena for participation of some (but 
not all) water users (Ducrot 2011).   
 
The historical re-construction of the articulation of water rights framework and the practices 
presented above feature a key role for the state and its institutions in the definition of water 
rights (the policy), in the registration of users and in the role of water users (the practices). 
The Regional Water Authorities with their operational units at river basin level establish who 
has the legal/formal right to abstract water from the river. Yet, structural challenges and local 
geographies shape the final outcome of water reforms. The examples portray several 
differences between water users that are not equal in terms or political connections, 
availability of financial resources, volume of water abstracted and also position in relation to 
the source. Ad hoc memoranda have introduced to deal with large-scale water users securing 
their water needs. Unable to collect money from large-scale users, local water authorities 
turned to smallholder farmers. Serving more as a means to register users and collect fees, 
rather then as information dissemination, water users’ groups were established.  Yet, unable 
or unwilling to pay water users escape registration remaining ‘invisible’ and their water use 
unaccounted, with the risk that the apparently ‘unexploited’ water is awarded to new large-
scale investors (Van der Zaag et al. 2010).  
 
A formal permit system could (still) have a positive impact in water management practices 
securing water for smallholder subsistence farmers and primary water uses. In terms of 
equitable resource allocation and sustainable water management, much can be gained by 
recognizing the unequal position of water users in socio-political and economic terms and the 
difficulties that water authorities encounter in the licensing process. In Limpopo river basin, 
water users´ groups and the focal points network offer the opportunity to involve small-scale 
users that cultivate their land outside big irrigation schemes in decision-making and 
information exchange. Ensuring their representation in the River Basin Committee will 
contribute to foster democratic practices in the management of water resources. 
 
Recent developments in the river basin, such as agro-industrial investments (e.g. MAI) and 
the new forms of agrarian change in Lower Limpopo (e.g. RBL-EP, see Ganho 2013), call for 
renovated attention towards resource allocation (who gets the water and how) and the role of 
state actors. Further research on the practices related with access and allocation of water 
resources within Mozambican river basins are necessary. Beside legal dimension involved 
with water rights framework, technical and socio-economic one should be investigated 
(Boelens and Zwarteveen 2005). These include the management and access to infrastructures 
and technologies that allow the users to physically access water and materialize their formal 
water rights; together with the ability of users to mobilize resources (e.g. money) and 
participate to decision-making processes.  
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